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to an injured child and one which can easily be misapplied,
unless it is fully understood. If our Court will not overrule
its applicability, it might be well for the Legislature to con-
sider a bar to its use, as has been done in two states which
are among those recognized as foremost in legal authority."s
VARYING TESTS FOR INSANITY
Salinger v. Superintendent of Spring Grove
State Hospital'
By MATmIs J. DEVrro*
In 1950, appellant was found insane at the time of com-
mitting alleged criminal offenses and insane at the time of
trial, by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City.2
The Court committed him to Spring Grove State Hospital
as authorized by statute.' In 1954, Salinger filed a petition
in Baltimore City requesting a jury to pass upon his sanity
pursuant to Article 59, Section 20.'
I See &upra, n. 5.
* Third Year Student, University of Maryland School of Law.
2 112 A. 2d 907 (Md., 1955).
2 For an account of the circumstances surrounding Salinger's trial, see
DeVito, Insanity as a Defense - MeNaghten Rule Repudiated by District
of Columbia, 15 Md. L. Rev. 44, 50 (1955).
'Md. Code (1951), Art. 59, Sec. 7, provides:
"If the jury find by their verdict that such person was at the time of
committing the offense and then is insane or lunatic, the court
before which trial was had shall cause such person to be sent to the
almshouse of the county or city in which such person resided at the
time of the commission of such act, or to a hospital, or some other
place better suited in the judgment of the court to the condition of
such prisoner, there to be confined until he shall have recovered his
reason and be discharged by due course of law. .. "
'Md. Code (1955 Supp.), Art. 59, Sec. 20, provides:
"Any person confined in any State or licensed private institution for
the care, custody or treatment of insane persons, . . . may file a petition
in the law courts of any county or Baltimore City, . . ., requesting
that the person so confined be brought before said Court for the pur-
pose of having the sanity of such person determined, and the Court
shall forthwith proceed to hear and determine the matter; . . . If the
Court or jury, as the case may be, shall determine that such person
is insane or is suffering from a mental disease, the Court shall order
said person committed to the institution from which he immediately
came, or to some other suitable institution, otherwie he shall be
discharged .... "
(This section was amended by the Laws of 1955, Ch. 352, to provide that
after a hearing has been held as outlined above, any further petition within
a year of the last hearing must be accompanied by affidavits of persons
other than himself showing the mental condition of the petitioner at the
time as compared with such condition at the time of the previous hearing.
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At the hearing, five psychiatrists testified that Salinger
knew the difference between right and wrong and under-
stood the nature and consequences of his acts as applied to
himself, but maintained that he was considered a dangerous
psychopath who had made no progress since his original
commitment and further, expressed no hope for future im-
provement in his illness. The petitioner's request that the
Court instruct the jury as to his eligibility for release solely
upon the basis of the "right-wrong" test,5 was refused. The
Court instructed the jury to apply the "right-wrong" test
but, in addition, if they found that appellant did have the
ability to distinguish between right and wrong, they must
further ask themselves:
"'If he becomes a free agent will he be a danger to
himself, to his own safety, or will he be a menace to the
safety of the person and/or the property of other
people? If you answer that question in the negative,
having answered the first question positively, then you
should find that he is sane'."6
The Court then added that if they answered the second
question in the affirmative, they would have to find that
the petitioner was insane. The jury found the petitioner
was insane.
The Court on the basis of the affidavits can hear the case or dismiss
the petition.)
See also Md. Code (1951), Art. 59, Sec. 7, where apparently habeas
corpus is made available for release from a mental institution after a com-
mittal from a criminal charge. It provides:
"... any judge of the Circuit Court for any county where such
person Is detained or of the supreme bench of Baltimore City, -as the
case may be, may, upon habeas corpus proceedings, make any order,
absolute or conditional, for the permanent or temporary discharge of the
person upon satisfactory proof of permanent or temporary recovery."
Apparently, a requirement under either of the aforementioned procedures
is outlined in Md. Code (1951), Art. 59, Sec. 13, which provides:
"No person committed to any almshouse or mental Institution under
the provisions of this sub-title shall be released therefrom without the
approval of a judge of the court in which said person's case was pend-
ing at the time of the commitment, or in which said person was ac-
quitted by reason of insanity. Such approval shall be in addition to
any other conditions Imposed by law on the discharge of persons com-
mitted to an almshouse or mental institution."
5 The "right-wrong" test as outlined in Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13 A.
809 (1888), is Maryland's equivalent of the famous McNaghten rule. For
a discussion of the "right-wrong" test in Maryland, see Insanity as a
Defense - MeNaghten Rule Repudiated by District of Columbia, supra,
n. 2, 46, and .Sobeloff, From McNaghten to Durham, and Beyond - A Dis-
cussion of Insanity and the Crimival Law, 15 Md. L. Rev. 93, 95 (1955).
For a discussion of the burden of proof where insanity is used as a defense
see Burden of Proof of Insaity in Criminal Cases, 15 Md. L. Rev. 157
(1955).
6 Supra, n. 1, 909.
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On appeal, the appellant's main contention was that the
Court erred in instructing the jury beyond the "right-
wrong" test. He maintained that since the Spencer case's
"right-wrong" test was used to determine appellant's crimi-
nal responsibility at the criminal trial which resulted in
appellant's committal to a mental institution, it alone
should be used as the criterion for release therefrom. In
other words, if the accused is committed because he did
not know the difference between right and wrong and the
nature and consequences of his acts as applied to himself,
he should likewise be released when a jury finds that he
does. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention and
affirmed the trial Court's charge.
In rejecting the appellant's contention, the Court first
pointed out that the use of the Spencer "right-wrong" test
was limited to the question of criminal responsibility,
stressing that the subsequent committal to a mental insti-
tution after an acquittal had no bearing upon the acts for
which defendant was tried, but instead, defendant's com-
mitment was a result of a determination that it would not
be safe for defendant to remain at large. In the Court's
language:
"One found to have been and to be insane in a crimi-
nal proceeding, is committed not because he did the act
which caused him to be brought into court, but because
it is not safe for him or the community for him to be at
large. The confinement is not punishment, it is cus-
todial. The acts which preceeded it merely served to
bring about a judicial determination in a particular
form of the need for custodial confinement. This essen-
tial fact is not changed because, to avoid the conse-
quences of his act, the accused, under Maryland Law,
must be suffering from a mental illness or a disease of
a kind and to a degree which brings him within the
Spencer rule. Other kinds and degrees of mental illness
and disease are, of course, well recognized by medicine
and the law and some of them make the victim a men-
ace to society and himself if he is at liberty.
7
The Court then affirmed the trial court's charge as the
test generally used to measure the right to confine or keep
confined one mentally ill, i.e., the "danger to himself and
society" test, and concluded reasoning:
"We hold that one who has been found not guilty of
a charge of crime, because of due determination of in-
7 Ibid.
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sanity in a criminal court, has the same status as one
confined as insane by virtue of some other procedure
established by law and, in order to obtain release, must
satisfy a judge or jury of his sanity, not only under
the Spencer rule but under the tests generally applied
as justifying confinement. This being so, the basis of
appellant's original commitment did not alone control
the answer to the question of whether he should be
released."8
There has been some understandable confusion,' con-
cerning this problem, i.e., the use of different tests to deter-
mine insanity at a criminal trial on the issue of criminal
responsibility and at a sanity hearing on a petition for re-
lease by a person committed after an acquittal at a criminal
trial. Understandable, because at first glance, appellant's
contention that there should be a single standard for in-
sanity both at the criminal trial and at the sanity hearing
seems reasonable. If the "right-wrong" test is used to deter-
mine defendant's sanity at the criminal trial, why then
should it not be used to determine defendant's sanity at
defendant's hearing for release? If the term "insanity"
were meant to describe a clear objective mental state in
both these instances, there could be no logical grounds
upon which appellant's contention could be rejected. But
the term "insanity" has no such single objective meaning
in the law today. 0 Instead it has become a word that has
been used loosely by the courts and legislatures alike to
describe various mental states and whose true meaning may
be determined only by its use in a specific situation. In
short, a given mental state can be classed as insanity in one
situation, and as sanity in another situation, according to
the standard of mental conduct or acuity required to accom-
plish "normal results" in the respective situation con-
sidered." As a result, distinct tests to measure this standard
8 Ib4, 910.
*Judge Niles, at the time of the first sanity hearing for release, in 1944,
(FDx parte in the Matter of Walter Debinski, Daily Record, May 2, 1944),
felt that the "right-wrong" test was the only one to be applied, but later,
in 1953, in an unpublished memorandum, indicated that he felt this was in
error, and that a test similar to the one in the instant case should also be
used - a prophecy confirmed by the result in the instant case.
w0 See Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense (1954) 5; Glueck,
Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law (1925) 12.
1 In Snyder v. Snyder, 142 Ill. 60, 31 N. E. 303, 305 (1892), the Illinois
Court said:
"What might be regarded as insanity or mental incapacity in the
one case would not necessarily be insanity in another. No definite rule
can e laid down which will apply to all cases alike."
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of conduct have arisen in each situation though they may
have been labeled in each instance "insanity tests". Thus,
the test to determine criminal responsibility, the test to
determine eligibility for release from a mental institu-
tion, the tests to determine contractual and testamentary
capacity 2 have all at times been called "insanity tests", yet
in each instance the law prescribes a different standard of
mental acuity or conduct. It becomes clear then, in view of
the different uses of the word "insanity" and the different
insanity tests, that, in order to evaluate any one insanity
test, it cannot be examined in relation to insanity tests in
other situations, but must be considered in relation to the
purpose for which it alone is being used. Therefore, appel-
lant's contention that there should be a single standard
for insanity both at a criminal trial where the issue is
criminal responsibility and at a sanity hearing where the
question is release, only has merit if it can be found that
the nature, purposes and public policy underlying both pro-
ceedings are so similar that a single standard of mental con-
duct will accomplish the desired results in both instances.
An investigation into each of these proceedings, therefore,
with an aim toward considering the applicability of a single
insanity test to cover both cases, seems warranted.
The "right-wrong" test employed at a criminal trial,
while popularly called an insanity test can be better
phrased a test for criminal responsibility, 8 since it is not
used to determine whether a person is normal or abnormal
in a medical sense, but rather to determine whether the
accused is suffering from the particular degree or type of
mental disorder which the law considers sufficient to render
one criminally irresponsible. The states employing the
"right-wrong" test do not maintain that knowing right from
wrong is the only criterion for measuring insanity, but do
contend that it is a valid criterion for ascertaining that type
or degree of insanity, as a result of the existence of which
the public policy of the state would deem it just or proper
to permit the acquittal of a person accused of a crime."
11For a discussion of insanity tests relating to testamentary capacity see
ATKiNSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW or WTITs (2d ed. 1953), 232 et seq.; as to
contracts, see 1 WILITSTON ON CONTRACrs (Rev. ed. 1936), Sec. 256.
i See eupra, n. 10.
"In Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 38, 13 A. 809 (1888). The Court in
approving the "right-wrong" rule said:
"... notwithstanding a party may do an act, being in itself criminal,
under the influence of an insane delusion, with a view of redressing or
revenging some supposed grievance, or injury, or of promoting some
public good, he is nevertheless punishable, if he had the capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong and knew at the time that he
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Thus, any defendant suffering a different type of mental
disorder, the law will hold as criminally responsible, while
perhaps still recognizing that the defendant may be men-
tally disordered. 5 When the issue is criminal responsi-
bility, the main concern of the court is to establish defen-
dant's guilt or innocence, and in so doing to use a test which
embodies that jurisdiction's philosophy as to the degree or
type of insanity that, in the interest of justice, should re-
lieve the actor from responsibility for his actions.16
When the determination has been made that the defen-
dant did not know the difference between right and wrong
at the time of the crime, the defendant is acquitted, but
if this condition is found to exist at the time of the trial he
is committed to a mental hospital, not as a sentence, for
defendant has been acquitted of his crime, but because a
person found irresponsible by reason of insanity under the
"right-wrong" test is also suffering from a mental disease
the nature of which requires the defendant to be hos-
pitalized for the welfare of himself and society. Thus, it is
clear that the Spencer 7 "right-wrong" test employed at a
criminal trial is not used as a criterion to gauge accused's
insanity for purposes of committal, but instead the need for
committal is necessarily included within a determination
of criminal irresponsibility where the condition persists
until the time of trial. Once committed, the accused is in
the same position as any other inmate, his particular type of
committal bearing no relation to his eligibility for release.'"
As distinguished from the test for criminal responsi-
bility, the test employed at sanity hearings for persons
seeking release from mental institutions differ, both in func-
tion and purpose. A person committed to a mental institu-
tion is so confined under the state's power as parens patria.
Essentially, he is committed because he is considered a
danger to the welfare of himself and society as a whole.
This applies as well to those confined as a result of deter-
minations of criminal irresponsibility as to those com-
was acting contrary to law. Therefore, if the party accused be con-
scious that the act was one that he ought not do, that act being con-
trary to law, he is punishable under the law."
Maryland, In Code (1951), Art. 31B, Sec. 5, has provided for Individuals
defined as defective delinquents who, though they do not satisfy the Spencer
"right-wrong" test suffer from a type of mental disorder, which makes them
dangerous to society and may warrant the imposition of an indeterminate
sentence for their treatment and the protection of society.
11 See WECHSLER, A THOUGHTFUL CODE OF SUBSTANTrVE LAW (The Ameri-
can Law Institute Proceedings, May 20, 1954), 45 J. Cr. L., 520, 524 (1955).
"Supra, n. 5.
'Supra, n. 1, 909, 910. See also Wagner v. M. & C. C. of Balto., 134 Md.
305, 106 A. 753 (1919).
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mitted under other involuntary commitment procedures."9
Since the basis of their confinement is that they are a
potential threat to society, upon petition for release it must
be determined whether, if discharged, they will be able to
take a place in society without becoming a menace to the
welfare of themselves and the society in which they will
live. Thus, the test to be applied in these cases of release,
regardless of the method of confinement, is the test applied
by the trial Court and adopted by the Court of Appeals
in the instant case.20
FURTHER ON VOLUNTARY SEPARATION AS
A GROUND FOR ABSOLUTE DIVORCE
Benson v. Benson'
By LuoNARD BLOOM*
This case is significant in that it departs from a previous
viewpoint of the Maryland Court of Appeals, and it does
so by the narrowest of margins, 3 to 2. In an action for
divorce a vinculo matrimonii, where the plaintiff relies
upon the statutory grounds of 3 years voluntary separation
between the parties, the question is here presented as to
whether the separated parties must have had a mutual in-
tent at the time of their separation not to resume marital
relations thereafter, in order that an absolute divorce de-
cree will issue. Secondly, and collateral to this, can the
parties at the time of their separation recognize or acknowl-
edge the possibility of a future reconciliation, or will such
an acknowledgment defeat the "voluntary" aspects of their
separation?
"-See Wells v Attorney General of the United States, 201 F. 2d 556, 559
(10th Cir., 1953), where it is said:
"The several states in their character as parens patriae have general
power and are under the general duty of caring for insane persons.
The prerogative is a segment of police power. In the exercise of such
power, insane persons may be restrained and confined both for the
welfare of themselves and for the protection of the public. And if the
exactions of due process are met, such restraint and confinement do
not violate any constitutional right of the individual."
9 Essentially the same policy underlies discharge from the Patuxent In-
stitute under the Defective Delinquent law. Md. Code (1951), Art. 31B.
* Second Year Evening Student, University of Maryland School of Law.
1204 Md. 601, 105 A. 2d 733 (1954). For earlier notes on this subject, see
Five Years Voluntary Separation As New Ground For Absolute Divorce,
2 Md. L. Rev. 357 (1938), and supplementary note thereto in 7 Md. L. Rev.
146 (1943).
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